UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAKE BALL TRUST, et al., 12-cv-5255

Plaintiffs,

v.

MATTHEW DURST, et al.,) Philadelphia, PA) January 15, 2013

Defendants.) 9:35 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOEL SCHNEIDER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs: VINCENT D'ELIA, ESQUIRE

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1 I N D E X 2 PAGE 3 Motion 3 **ARGUMENT:** 4 Re: To add the beneficiaries as named plaintiffs 5 6 BY: Mr. D'Elia 5 7 BY: Ms. Lentini 10 8 BY: Mr. Yacovelle 21 9 10 Re: To add the two law firms and Kelly Peck 11 **ARGUMENT:** BY: Mr. D'Elia 12 23 13 BY: Mr. Yacovelle 14 Re: Plaintiff's request to join 25 15 Mr. Yacovelle as a defendant 16 17 **ARGUMENT:** 25, 39 18 BY: Mr. D'Elia 32, 44 19 BY: Mr. Yacovelle BY: Ms. Lentini 20 41 21 22 THE COURT: Decision 23 46

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(The following was heard in open court at 9:35 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.

MR. D'ELIA: Good morning, Your Honor.

MR. YACOVELLE: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Please be seated. We're on the record, and this is the matter of Steven and Reuben Durst v. Matthew Durst, docket 12-5255. Can we have the entries of appearance, starting with the plaintiff, please?

MR. D'ELIA: Good morning, Your Honor. I am Vincent D'Elia. I represent the plaintiffs. Seated to my right is my associate, Teresa Lentini.

MR. YACOVELLE: Good morning, Your Honor. John Yacovelle for the defendant counterclaimants.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. We're here for oral argument on plaintiff's motion to amend complaint and disqualify Mr. Yacovelle as attorney for Matthew Durst and remove to State Court. If it hasn't already been made clear, counsel, this Court will address all of those issues except for the issue of whether the case should be remanded back to State Court, but depending upon how the Court rules on the various aspects, it may moot out the remand issue.

So the Court has read the papers. The Court is familiar with the issues. It's plaintiff's motion. We'll hear from plaintiff first, but I think a good way to proceed is this, counsel. There's different parts to this motion, and I

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broke it down, and I think we ought to deal with the issues separately, and I'll tell you the issues I have, and then you can tell me if I missed anything.

One is plaintiffs wants to amend their complaint to add the beneficiaries as plaintiffs; two, plaintiffs want to amend their complaint to assert that Steven Durst is also suing in his capacity as a trustee; three, plaintiffs want to add as defendants on a malpractice claim Halloran & Sage, Robinson & Cole, and Kelly Galica Peck; four, plaintiffs want to add as a defendant Mr. Yacovelle; five, plaintiffs wants to disqualify Mr. Yacovelle. Those are the five issues I have, and then the last issue is the remand issue, and that's left for Judge Simandle.

Counsel, did I miss any issues --

MR. D'ELIA: No.

THE COURT: -- or did I misstate any of the issues?

MR. D'ELIA: No and no. You identified the issues, and I do not believe you missed any. That is pretty much what I had.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel. Let me start with what I think hopefully might be the easiest issue, and that is plaintiff's request to amend the complaint to make it clear that Mr. Steven Durst is pursuing his claim in his capacity as the trustee as well as an individual. Defendant, is there any objection to that amendment?

D'Elia - Argument

MR. YACOVELLE: No objection to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So eventually, the Court will issue an order granting the amendment to naming Steven Durst, the plaintiff, as an individual and in his capacity as the trustee.

Okay. Next issue. Plaintiff, you want to add the beneficiaries as named plaintiffs. Let's address that issue, and like I said, we'll address the issues one at a time. We'll hear your argument and we'll hear defendant's argument.

MR. D'ELIA: Judge, my argument is very brief. We felt that in the prior State proceeding, there was a lack of regard for the requirements of the trust in prosecuting that case.

In our case, we want to make sure that we have done everything according to the book. In that regard, we are simply -- we are adding the -- adding those plaintiffs in an effort to make sure that everyone was on notice. Plaintiffs can choose to opt out. I understand that they will do that. That's their right to do so.

THE COURT: Well, opt out, this is not a class action.

MR. D'ELIA: No. No. I know. I know it's not, but all as I'm saying is I -- all as I'm doing is making sure everyone is on notice, and I leave it to the discretion of the Court. It's not a --

D'Elia - Argument

THE COURT: Counsel, you're doing more than putting everybody on notice. You're seeking -- you're representing that you represent these people and you want to join them as named plaintiffs in the lawsuit. That's a lot different than sending them a letter telling them that this lawsuit is filed. That's very, very different.

MR. D'ELIA: The two trustee -- the two trustees that are active right now, Judge -- I wanted to make sure they were brought in -- I leave to the Court's sound discretion.

THE COURT: Why do you want them in?

MR. D'ELIA: For the reason I've said. I really want to make sure they're on notice as to what's going on and make sure they understand that they have -- they have the right to assert a claim here.

THE COURT: What -- what should I do about the two beneficiaries who submitted affidavits saying that they don't want to be represented by you and they don't want to be plaintiffs?

MR. D'ELIA: We can dismiss them.

THE COURT: What about the other seven or eight? How do I know how they feel?

MR. D'ELIA: Two of them have let you know how they feel. The others have not made any expression --

THE COURT: How do I know they're on notice? Did you send them a copy -- do you -- are you in an attorney/client

D'Elia - Argument 7 1 relationship with these beneficiaries? MR. D'ELIA: I'm in an attorney/client relationship 2 3 with the two trustees who have been in touch with all the beneficiaries, and I'm delighted to provide whatever 4 5 certification the Court may want to indicate their positions on this. I'm satisfied from having discussed with the two 6 trustees that the beneficiaries that are the decedents of the 7 grantor are interested in being plaintiffs in the case for 8 9 sure. 10 THE COURT: Are you -- you're seeking to represent --11 I don't know how many there are -- seven or eight or nine people. 12 MR. D'ELIA: Yes. There's nine. 13 14 THE COURT: Are you representing that you have the authority from each of those nine people to represent them in 15 this lawsuit? 16 17 MR. D'ELIA: I cannot say that I talked to them in 18 that --THE COURT: So then how could you seek to name them 19 as plaintiffs and how can you seek to represent them if you 20 2.1 don't have their authority? 22 MR. D'ELIA: Because I represent the trustees, Your 23 Honor. THE COURT: So what? 24 25 MR. D'ELIA: Well, the trustees have an obligation to

D'Elia - Argument the -- to the beneficiaries. 1 THE COURT: You're seeking to represent, for example, 2 3 the defendant's son, correct? MR. D'ELIA: Correct. 4 5 THE COURT: And you're seeking to -- you're 6 representing that you're representing the defendant's son who's suing his father, right? 7 MR. D'ELIA: Correct. 8 THE COURT: And that son submitted an affidavit 9 10 saying you have no authority to act on his behalf? 11 MR. D'ELIA: But he says --12 THE COURT: So how can I grant this motion? 13 MR. D'ELIA: He -- that's right. The trustees have 14 indicated that they want to bring the suit on behalf of the 15 beneficiaries, and this beneficiary says I want no part of it. He should be -- he should be dismissed. 16 THE COURT: Well, how do I --17 18 MR. D'ELIA: How do I protect --19 THE COURT: How do I know how the seven or eight other people feel? 20 MR. D'ELIA: I'd be glad to provide supplemental 21 22 certifications for Your Honor, and I apologize for not doing 23 that. Be glad to provide them for you. THE COURT: Why do we need them in the case? 24 25 MR. D'ELIA: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

D'Elia - Argument 9 1 THE COURT: Why do we need them in the case? MR. D'ELIA: We need -- so their voices can be heard, 2 3 Judge. I mean, I'm leaving it to your discretion, and I understand --4 5 THE COURT: Aren't the --MR. D'ELIA: -- your problem here. 6 7 THE COURT: Aren't the trustees the real parties in interest? 8 MR. D'ELIA: Yes. 9 10 THE COURT: So why do we need the beneficiaries in 11 the case? MR. D'ELIA: The beneficiaries tried to have their 12 voices heard in the State Court action, and they were denied. 13 14 They --THE COURT: The beneficiaries or your clients sought 15 to intervene in the State case? 16 17 MR. D'ELIA: Clients sought to intervene, and the 18 beneficiaries, although they did not, because we never got that far, because the Judge had mooted -- decision mooted out the 19 issue, but the beneficiaries were going to be joined in that 20 21 case had the intervenors been allowed to proceed and had the --22 had the settlement been set aside. 23 THE COURT: Joined as what? Plaintiffs? MR. D'ELIA: They would have been joined as 24 25 intervenors, as the other intervenors were. Teresa -- maybe

Teresa can answer that for you.

MS. LENTINI: Your Honor, I just wanted to add for the -- bring it to the Court's attention that there are different denominations of beneficiaries under the trust agreement. The primary beneficiaries, there are eight of them. All eight of them are the children of Steven Durst. Three of those children did come forward in the State litigation at the time that Reuben Durst and Steven Durst were -- had petitioned to intervene to object to the settlement agreement and to be heard. They were not heard. They were not joined. They -- you know, there was no consideration by the State Court, but this is not a trust that operates where all the beneficiaries are on an equal level.

These are Mr. Steven Durst's nine children who are the primary beneficiaries, and the depletion of the trust --

THE COURT: Nine or eight?

MS. LENTINI: There's eight. I'm sorry. I gave him another one. The depletion of the trust affects these eight children primarily, because when we go through the trust agreement and get further into this matter, Your Honor will see that there are secondary beneficiaries to it, and part of the claim in this for the malpractice and also for the misappropriation of the funds and breach of fiduciary duty is that distributions were made by the defendant to his children as the beneficiaries in breach of his fiduciary duties and in

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Lentini - Argument
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      breach of the terms.
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                So the primary -- the beneficiaries with the most to
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      lose are Steven Durst's children, and he is the one who
      originally set up this trust, and he's the one who initially
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      funded it. This was all his money.
                THE COURT: Well, my question to you is in your
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      proposed amendment --
                MS. LENTINI: Is to add --
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                THE COURT: This --
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                MS. LENTINI: -- add all of them, because --
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                THE COURT: This is -- you're making an entirely new
      argument that wasn't in the brief. Your motion does not
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      distinguish between primary and secondary beneficiaries,
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      correct?
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                MS. LENTINI: My -- no. You are correct, Your Honor.
      My --
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                THE COURT: Your motion seeks to join all the
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      beneficiaries.
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                MS. LENTINI: Absolutely, because who am I to decide
      who doesn't want to be involved in it and who does not? That
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      is their decision.
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                THE COURT: Yes, but how could you -- how could you
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      seek to represent them without authority to act on their
      behalf?
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                MS. LENTINI: Because the trust -- the trust gives us
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Lentini - Argument 12 1 the right to act on their behalf. THE COURT: Why do they --2 3 MS. LENTINI: We have a --THE COURT: Why do they need to --4 5 MS. LENTINI: We have a fiduciary right to -- I mean 6 the fiduciary obligation to represent them and protect them, 7 and if it comes down to, you know, Mr. Durst's nine children, the primary beneficiaries with the greatest losses all want to 8 remain as participants in this, then they came remain as 9 participants. We have no objection if someone does not wish to 10 11 participate. THE COURT: But aren't the beneficiaries' interests 12 13 being protected by the trustees? That's their job. 14 MS. LENTINI: They may feel that it's not being --15 they're not being represented, because there's a dispute between the trustees. They may not agree with either trustee. 16 They may want their own counsel, and we don't want to get --17 18 turn around in six months from now or a year from now and have one of them come back and say both of you are wrong and we're 19 going to come after both of you or we're going to come after 20 21 you or come after your trustees. 22 All -- it's -- all we want to do is give them the

opportunity to be represented. If they choose not to be part

of this or they choose to say, you know, we want to be

represented by Mr. D'Elia or want to be represented -- you

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know, our interests are with Mr. Yacovelle, then that's fine.

THE COURT: But aren't you doing it backwards? Shouldn't you get that authority before you week to name them as plaintiffs in the case? Here, what you're doing is you're seeking to name them in a case, and then if they come to you and say I don't want you to represent me, well, okay, we'll take you off the caption. Shouldn't you do it the other way around?

MS. LENTINI: We can do it that way, Your Honor. That's a legitimate point, and it accomplishes the same manner. I can do it that way and then resubmit for the ones, if any -- you know, any of the ones who wish to be specifically named and represented or if any of them wish to have their own counsel enter appearance.

THE COURT: Do you believe that the beneficiaries are real parties in interest?

MS. LENTINI: Yes.

THE COURT: Are they necessary parties?

MS. LENTINI: I believe that -- I believe that they are, and the only -- the reason that I believe that they are is because this is not a dispute between the trust and the Goodman (phonetic) entities, like it was in the State litigation. This is a dispute between the trustees that directly affects them, and whether or not they're being properly represented or whether or not their direct interests are being heard by the

Court in a manner in which they want to present it or what issues they feel is important, then yes.

I can't determine what part would be the most important to them. I mean, we are going forward to try and represent the trust in the best fashion in accordance with the trust agreement, but we also have issues of malpractice. We also have issues with Ms. Peck and the Holloran and the other law firm that drafted the trust agreements.

So we are going to be coming before this Court asking for interpretation of a trust agreement, interpretation of two amendments which follow it, and all of that is going to affect them. It's not just about Matthew Durst or Mr. Yacovelle. This is about the original trust and the two subsequent amendments, and all of it's going to come into issue.

So if they want to be present and they want their own attorney or they -- they have a right to be a party and stand up and stay we disagree with that interpretation or we disagree with how that was drafted or no, this -- because all of that is going to be before this Court. This is not just one minor issue of --

THE COURT: Suppose a beneficiary doesn't agree with the position taken by one of the plaintiff trustees. Then what?

MS. LENTINI: Then they're going to have to get their own counsel, and we'll have to address that before the Court,

Lentini - Argument 15 and there would be a recommendation. 1 THE COURT: If I permit the joinder --2 3 MS. LENTINI: Uh-huh. THE COURT: -- of these beneficiaries, does this 4 5 Court still have jurisdiction over the case? MS. LENTINI: It would depend -- it would -- on the 6 7 face of it, no, but since we've already been notified that two of the beneficiaries do not wish to be -- secondary 8 beneficiaries do not wish to be joined, I believe that the 9 Court would still have jurisdiction. So we would not name them 10 11 as plaintiffs. 12 THE COURT: Do you believe -- let's assume that the beneficiaries or at least some of them are joined. 13 14 MS. LENTINI: Uh-huh. THE COURT: When the Court looks at whether it has 15 diversity jurisdiction over this case, do you believe the Court 16 17 should look to the citizenship of the beneficiaries in addition to the citizenship of the trustees? 18 MS. LENTINI: Yes. 19 THE COURT: And what authority do you have for that? 20 21 MS. LENTINI: (No audible response). 22 THE COURT: Can I respectfully suggest, counsel --23 MS. LENTINI: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- that you take a look at the Supreme 24 Court's decision in Navarro? 25

Lentini - Argument 16 MS. LENTINI: Navarro, Your Honor? 1 2 THE COURT: Navarro. 3 MS. LENTINI: Navarro. THE COURT: N-A-V-A-R-R-O. 4 5 MS. LENTINI: Uh-huh. THE COURT: 446 U.S. 458 (1980). 6 I will look at that, Your Honor, but --7 MS. LENTINI: THE COURT: And you may want to --8 The issue --9 MS. LENTINI: 10 THE COURT: I don't know what they call it these 11 days, Shepardize or key cite. Judge Irenas recently wrote an opinion on that a few months ago about the citizenship in this 12 context, and I would respectfully request that you should 13 examine whether the citizenship of the beneficiaries is 14 relevant for diversity purposes when the trust is not a party 15 to the case, and then I would ask -- I'm going to ask you and 16 17 your colleague that the argument being made by the defendant is 18 that the only reason you're seeking to join these beneficiaries is to destroy diversity and remand the case, and I'm suggesting 19 that you look at the case law and examine whether or not the 20 21 citizenship of the beneficiaries has any relevance to the 22 diversity issue, and if it doesn't, do you still want to join 23 these beneficiaries.

MS. LENTINI: Your Honor, respectfully, the two

beneficiaries that have already notified us, the secondary

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Lentini - Argument
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      beneficiaries, so the Matthew Durst children, they've already
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      notified us that they do not wish to participate as a party to
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      the action. Therefore, whether it went by the citizenship of
      the trust or the citizenship of the beneficiaries, it becomes
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      irrelevant.
                There is no -- diversity of jurisdiction is not
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      destroyed at that point, and therefore, actually, the remand
      back to the State Court would be -- on that issue is not
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      relevant.
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                THE COURT: What about the seven or eight or nine --
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                MS. LENTINI: They're all --
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                THE COURT: -- other people?
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                                   They're all different places.
                MS. LENTINI: No.
      There's no -- diversity is not affected at all.
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                THE COURT: So the only people who might affect
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      diversity are who? Matthew --
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                MS. LENTINI: Matthew Durst's --
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                THE COURT: -- Durst, Jr.?
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                MS. LENTINI: Two children.
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                THE COURT: His two children.
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                MS. LENTINI: His two children.
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                THE COURT: And they're the only two people who could
      destroy diversity --
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                MS. LENTINI: Yes.
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                THE COURT: -- in your judgment?
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Lentini - Argument 18 MS. LENTINI: Out of all of the beneficiaries. 1 THE COURT: So at the end of the day, this remand 2 3 issue may be moot. MS. LENTINI: Correct, Your Honor. 4 5 MR. D'ELIA: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. But we're going to follow up by 6 7 supplemental briefs after this hearing, and I'm going to ask the plaintiffs, you know, to clarify their position about 8 whether they still believe it's necessary or appropriate to 9 join the beneficiaries if their joinder will not impact whether 10 this case is remanded or not. 11 MS. LENTINI: Your Honor, would you like me before we 12 -- would you like me to -- I think it might be -- because you 13 brought this up also, is to directly contact you and receive --14 15 provide an affidavit from anyone who wishes to be a party? THE COURT: We'll circle back at the end of this 16 17 argument or during this argument about that point. That's 18 something that I am considering, because let's assume for the sake of argument you come up with seven or eight affidavits of 19 people who say yes, they want to become parties. 20 21

MS. LENTINI: Uh-huh.

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THE COURT: I'm still not convinced yet of a good reason why they should be joined as plaintiffs in the case if they're "merely only beneficiaries", because the trustee, the two plaintiff trustees are there to represent their interests.

Lentini - Argument 19 1 So why do we need the beneficiaries there? Suppose there were a thousand beneficiaries of this 2 3 trust. Would all thousand be a plaintiff in the case? MS. LENTINI: They potentially could be, because the 4 5 Federal rules don't prohibit them from being. The rule 6 provides that the trustee may proceed without naming them. 7 doesn't prohibit them from listing them, and that does seem absurd when you put it that way. It does. 8 9 The primary concern here are Mr. Durst's children, the eight of them. 10 11 THE COURT: Which Durst? We have to be careful. 12 MS. LENTINI: I'm sorry. 13 MR. D'ELIA: Yes. MS. LENTINI: Steven Durst's children, does not 14 15 destroy diversity, but there was no way to bring this without -- we couldn't list eight and say, you know, the rest of you 16 17 not --18 THE COURT: Why not? MS. LENTINI: Why not? Because then it would be in 19 front of you, and you'd be asking me why didn't you list the 20 21 rest of them. I -- the rule is to put more people on notice 22 than less people --23 THE COURT: One --MS. LENTINI: -- but --24 25 THE COURT: One way the Court can handle this is to

Lentini/Yacovelle - Argument 20 1 say -- and I don't know which way I'm going to rule right now, but one way I could handle this is to say if the Court decides 2 3 that the beneficiaries should be plaintiffs, if they want to, that the amendment is granted only as to those plaintiffs who 4 5 submit affidavits saying they want to be a party to the case. 6 That's one way to handle it, or the other thing is to say that 7 in the Court's discretion, we don't need them and it will just unduly complicate the case and the request is denied. 8 9 I don't know which way I'm going to rule on that 10 issue, but --11 MS. LENTINI: And Your --THE COURT: -- I think what we have clarified though 12 is that no matter how this motion winds up, a remand issue is 13 going to be moot --14 15 MS. LENTINI: Correct. THE COURT: -- seems to me. Okay. All right. 16 17 -- we're still on this beneficiary issue. Let's go to defense counsel, what you have to say about it. I mean, it's -- now 18 it's -- now the plaintiffs are acknowledging that your clients 19 -- are they both children of Matthew Durst? 20 MS. LENTINI: Yes, Your Honor. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. YACOVELLE: Actually, there are three, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. 24 25 MR. YACOVELLE: He has a minor who we had to cross

Yacovelle - Argument 21 1 out papers and another minor who just became an adult, and then he's got the third son that's at the University of Delaware who 2 3 filed a separate affidavit. All three of them want no parts of it as well as, by the way, I believe that we filed an affidavit 4 5 from a Mrs. Naqua (phonetic), who had two of the proposed named 6 beneficiaries. She wanted no parts of it on her behalf, and I 7 saw a copy of a letter from a man named Rayle (phonetic) who lives out in Wisconsin who sent a letter to Mr. D'Elia telling 8 him that he'd heard that he was going to be a plaintiff and 9 10 that he wanted no parts of it. 11 THE COURT: Can you give me the names first of your client's three children? 12 MR. YACOVELLE: Yes. Benjamin. 13 THE COURT: Benjamin C. Durst? 14 15 MR. YACOVELLE: Right. Thomas. Thomas S. Durst? 16 THE COURT: 17 MR. YACOVELLE: Yes. And Matthew, Jr. THE COURT: I don't see -- oh, is that Matthew R. 18 Durst? 19 20 MR. YACOVELLE: I guess it is. Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Those are the three children of 21 22 your client who you strongly suspect don't want to sue their 23 father. Right. And by the way, they are the 24 MR. YACOVELLE:

only people in this application who have anything to do with

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Yacovelle - Argument 22 diversity, because they live in Connecticut, like their father, 1 domiciled. 2 3 THE COURT: I think we're agreed that that issue --MR. YACOVELLE: Yes. 4 THE COURT: -- is now moot. 5 MR. YACOVELLE: Right. 6 7 THE COURT: I don't think we have to go there. MR. YACOVELLE: Right. In which case, other than one 8 point, I don't have anything else to add on this beneficiary 9 10 issue, and that is, since Your Honor is considering different ways to do it -- deal with it, if these beneficiaries came 11 forward in the Superior Court of New Jersey and said they 12 wanted to be heard, made application of any kind whatsoever to 13 that Court and were turned away, I must have been in a coma 14 15 somewhere, because I never heard of it. Didn't happen. THE COURT: Okay. So we're going to circle back 16 about this beneficiary issue, but we've already addressed it. 17 18 The next issue I'd like to address is the request to amend the complaint to add the two law firms and Kelly Peck. Is that a 19 Ms. Peck? Is Kelly a woman? 20 MR. D'ELIA: It's --21 22 MR. YACOVELLE: Yes. 23 MR. D'ELIA: -- Ms. Yes. THE COURT: Okay. And as I understand it, plaintiff, 24 25 the allegation is it's a malpractice claim against them.

MR. YACOVELLE: Judge, I don't speak for any of them

up there, and so I'm really not in much of a position to

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object. It's --

Yacovelle - Argument 24 THE COURT: Yes, you are. You're the defendant. 1 MR. YACOVELLE: Well --2 3 THE COURT: You can object on -- it will make the case unduly complex --4 5 MR. YACOVELLE: It will make it -- yes. THE COURT: -- et cetera, et cetera. 6 7 MR. YACOVELLE: Well, it's going to get unwieldy enough anyway. So -- on other matters. So I don't have 8 anything in particular to offer there except to point out --9 10 and it's pretty interesting -- that the plaintiffs who claim 11 that a certain asset is worth a ton of a money --12 THE COURT: We'll get into that. MR. YACOVELLE: -- are now complaining --13 THE COURT: We'll get into that. We'll get into that 14 15 issue, but I'm hearing that you don't object to the joinder of these three legal malpractice defendants. 16 17 MR. YACOVELLE: No. I need company, Judge. 18 THE COURT: So that will be granted except, plaintiff, I'm going to ask you to properly plead the 19 citizenship of these three proposed additional defendants. 20 think your amended complaint says something to the effect that 21 22 she's a Connecticut lawyer and these are Connecticut law firms. 23 MR. D'ELIA: Got you. THE COURT: I don't think that satisfied the 24 jurisdictional requirements. So we'll just have to clarify 25

that to make it comply with the applicable law.

Now I think we get to the -- maybe the most contentious issue, and that's plaintiff's request to join Mr. Yacovelle as a defendant in the case, and what flows from that is if that's granted, whether or not he necessarily must be disqualified. Plaintiff, tell me if I'm summarizing, and if I'm not, I want to hear it from you, the essence of the plaintiff's claim against Mr. Yacovelle.

I think what I understood from reading the pleadings, proposed pleadings and your brief, is that Mr. Yacovelle represented Matthew Durst in connection with this litigation that was filed in State Court in Cumberland County. That case was eventually settled, and I know defendant is going to want to get into the collateral estoppel issue, but that's an issue for Judge Simandle.

My understanding of your claim is, and I want you to correct me if I'm wrong, is that you're saying that Mr. Yacovelle as the attorney for Mr. Durst should have taken certain actions in that case that he didn't take and/or should have notified your clients of certain developments in that case, which he didn't do. So help me understand what you're -- if I'm understanding your claim against Mr. Yacovelle correctly, and what is your claim about?

MR. D'ELIA: Okay. Mr. Yacovelle represented Matthew Durst in his capacity as trustee. The real -- the party -- I'm

D'Elia - Argument

using this term loosely -- in interest, if you will, was the trust, not Matthew personally. In represent --

THE COURT: But there's no dispute about that.

That --

MR. D'ELIA: No. No. No. But --

THE COURT: That's how the complaint was captioned. He represented Matthew Durst as a trustee.

MR. D'ELIA: Okay. So -- and Matthew Durst as the fiduciary who had a responsibility to the beneficiaries and to the trust. During that -- during that -- the trust documents are very clear that two trustees have to make the decisions. That was ignored by Matthew Durst and his attorney.

There was provisions that certain assets were pledged as collateral to the grantor that were dissipated in the course of the settlement without any consultation with the -- with the other trustee or with the creditor of that particular asset.

There was -- additionally, in settling the case, they had failed -- like I said, failed to consult with the other trustee, didn't consider the valuations that were put on the properties in making the settlement. We believe that there are a whole series of breach of fiduciary obligations by Matthew and his then attorney.

THE COURT: So my question is everything you just said, those are questions of fact, and they're going to be issues that may or may not be litigated in this case.

D'Elia - Argument 27 1 MR. D'ELIA: Correct. THE COURT: Aren't those claims against Matthew? 2 3 You're saying Matthew breached those duties, Matthew entered into the settlement without authority., Matthew undervalued 4 5 this property, Matthew didn't act in the best interest of the 6 I understand that claim. How do you get a claim 7 against Mr. Yacovelle? He's an attorney for Matthew Durst. He's not your client's attorney. 8 MR. D'ELIA: My client being the trust? He certainly 9 10 was the attorney for the trust, and in representing the trust, 11 he failed -- he failed to discharge his --12 THE COURT: Why is he an attorney for the trust? The plaintiff in the case --13 MR. D'ELIA: -- is Matthew Durst, trustee. 14 THE COURT: -- is Matthew Durst as a trustee. 15 MR. D'ELIA: Of the trust. 16 17 THE COURT: He has represented one trustee in the In fact, the trust was dismissed as a party. So he 18 case. couldn't represent the trust. 19

THE COURT: Well, on the -- the technical legal basis that a trust doesn't have standing, that the right way to do it is in the name of the trustee, but at the end of the day, it was the trust and the trust assets, and in representing that trust, he disregarded his obligations to the trust, and you have another trustee --

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THE COURT: Here's what I'm wrestling with, counsel.

that's not an act of malpractice, I understand it. Today, I'm

just asking to let me amend the complaint to assert it.

Mr. Yacovelle represents Matthew Durst as a trustee. As far as I can see, he never represented in any of the papers that he represented Reuben or Steven Durst. I'm assuming -- and I could be wrong -- that Mr. Yacovelle is going to stand up and say Matthew Durst had the authority to act as he did and he didn't need the permission of the other trustees, but that's going to be an issue that's going to be litigated.

If Mr. Yacovelle's client was Matthew Durst only, how can two nonclients sue him for malpractice? His -- if you were representing Matthew Durst and Matthew Durst was saying Mr. Yacovelle committed malpractice, that's a no-brainer, right? But your clients are not in an attorney/client relationship with Mr. Yacovelle. So how could they have a basis for asserting a malpractice claim against him? That's what I'm wrestling with.

MR. D'ELIA: I understand what you're wrestling with. Let's take your example from earlier. Suppose there were a thousand trustees, and it said it has to be -- decisions have to be made by a majority of the thousand trustees and Mr. Yacovelle took one trustee, represented the one trustee, depleted the trust assets, disregarded the loan and the collateral and committed what we can -- we believe are the acts of malpractice in representing the trust's interests without regard to all those other trustees. You're telling me the other 999 trustees have no claim against him. I disagree, and

I disagree, because, in essence, he was representing the trust, Matthew Durst, trustee, and he -- he reads the document. It says decisions have to be made by two. I'm just going to go with the one, and I'm going to make decisions that are going to result in substantial assets being depleted. I'm going to allow the collateral to be sold -- to be conveyed despite the fact that there's a lien -- there's a security interest against it, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. These are acts of malpractice that the -- if the -- the trustees have to -- they have to be able to assert that claim.

And you're right. When he says I only represented one of the thousand trustees, so only that one can sue him, I disagree. His acts were against the trust.

THE COURT: The -- well, that's going to be the -- probably the key question. You're saying that Mr. Yacovelle not only represented Matthew Durst, but he also represented Steven and Reuben Durst. That's what you're saying.

MR. D'ELIA: I'm saying he had an obligation to represent them by virtue of the fact that he was representing Matthew in his capacity as a trustee. If I had a document that says decisions can only be made by me and you and I, as the attorney, went and let the decisions be made by one and I proceeded against the third -- that third party, that third party absolutely has that claim.

In this case, it's a trust instrument. He had an

obligation to the trust, and again, I'm not here to argue the case. I'm here to argue please let me have my day in court on that issue, and I believe it's a legitimate issue. Did he represent the trust or not represent the trust, and if he represented the trust, we respectfully submit he committed malpractice in that representation.

THE COURT: You are going to have your day in court, because no matter what happens with the joinder of Mr.

Yacovelle, you're going to make this claim against Mr. Durst, Mr. Matthew Durst. You're going to say Mr. Matthew Durst, you didn't have authority to act in that State case without the approval, authority, what have you, of Steven and Reuben. So you're going to have your day in court. The issue --

MR. D'ELIA: I want my day in court against the attorney who disregarded the trust documents in allowing that to happen.

THE COURT: A legal issue is going to be what duty
Mr. Yacovelle owed to Steven and Reuben. That's the legal
issue, did he owe a duty to them. There's no question he owed
a duty to Matthew Durst. That was his client.

MR. D'ELIA: To the disregard of the trust. To the detriment of the trust. I respectfully disagree, because the end of the day, he was representing the trust, and he failed in discharging that obligation.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear from Mr. Yacovelle --

MR. D'ELIA: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- and then we'll come back.

MR. D'ELIA: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. YACOVELLE: Judge, I didn't go into any response on this issue in the brief simply because I'm a little squeamish about it, and I don't want to be in a position of making arguments when I obviously have a personal interest in the success of the arguments, and so I didn't go into any detail about it, but Your Honor has hit on the issue, which is from the very first minute of my involvement in this case, I was told I would be appearing from Matthew Durst, the trustee, the trustee of the Jake Ball Trust. Heard that from none other than Steve Durst, who at the time represented himself as grantor, but we now learn maybe he was even a trustee, maybe. I'm not conceding that, but we'll see how that turns out.

Anyway, and if you look at any of the documents, any of the assets that were obtained, anything that was put into the trust, all the paperwork says Matthew Durst, trustee, owns a ten percent interest, Matthew Durst, trustee owns a 20 percent interest, Matthew Durst, trustee had to sign the notes on the 1600 building and so forth, and this other fellow never appeared until after the case was settled, Reuben. Never heard him. Didn't know him. Never met him. Never reported to him.

And, by the way, when this -- when this trust agreement surfaced, which happens, by the way, to have been

after the case was settled, it doesn't say that it requires two people to decide the case. It says that no one can question the authority of the trustee, the trustee, either of them really, I guess, on the papers, to settle the case. And so the representation was made at a settlement conference and in court by Matthew that he had authority to settle the case, which, if you read the documents, he did, and he settled the case.

Now, if Matthew came along and said well, my lawyer told me I could do this and I shouldn't do that and he was wrong and I believed him and I went ahead and settled this case but I wouldn't have except for his bad advice, now we have Matthew sitting with a cross-claim, I guess, or a third-party claim, some kind of a claim against me for negligence in advising him. We would have that situation. How we get to a duty to these other two gentlemen is a serious question.

Now, I understand that the cases out of New Jersey and this Court are very liberal when it comes to amending complaints, and I also understand that in the context of malpractice actions by your client, that can be going on right during the course of a trial where you're still representing your client. That's <u>Circle Motors</u>, <u>Mystic Island</u>. Those are New Jersey cases, and there's also cases out of this Court, and, in fact, it has to, because if -- if the claim exists and is a known claim by a party that has a justiciable interest and he doesn't bring it, it's barred even though it creates all

kind of confusion during the case, because he's suing his own lawyer, and that, of course, is a consequence of the entire controversy doctrine, which is a New Jersey doctrine which is followed in this Court.

So if you have a legitimate claim, you have to make it. If it throws the case into confusion and turmoil, that's something under Federal case and State cases -- Justice Handler wrote most of these decisions, by the way -- the Court is supposed to manage. He doesn't say you can't bring the claim, because you're on record now. You've made your claim and there you are, but the Court can then say well -- and it's also under I guess Rule 42 maybe. I could be wrong about that number -- can lead to bifurcation, can lead to separating out the malpractice claims from the other claims, and remember here, we've got a jury demand and we've got the whole rest of the case, nonjury, equitable issues and that kind of thing.

So there are ways to deal with it. If it's a legitimate claim, there are ways to deal with it, but it's really not a valid claim if there's no attorney/client relationship, if there's no duty, and the -- basically, the claim is saying well, I didn't advise Matthew. They don't know what I advised Matthew. Matthew hasn't testified to any of this stuff, and they'll find out when they take his deposition, but -- and it won't be too late then for that matter if they come up with some ground to amend.

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THE COURT: I think the issue that I want to focus on is the futility argument and did you owe a legal duty to Steven and Reuben Durst which would give them standing to assert a legal malpractice claim against you. That is the issue that I'd like to focus on, and we can get to the management issues, the severance issues at some other time, if necessary.

But do you believe that you had a legal duty to Steven and Reuben such that they have standing to assert a legal malpractice claim against you?

MR. YACOVELLE: I don't see what it could have been founded on. First of all, Steven got me into it, because he had a conflict as the grantor. That's what he said to me. he gets me into the case, and from them on, my primary job is keeping him at a distance, because he tries to run everything, and so therefore, I have to keep -- keep my client on course, and there was never any question that Steve Durst thought for one second that I was representing him. Now -- he comes along now and he says oh, by the way, I was a trustee the whole time, which is kind of interesting, and if he was a trustee the whole time, had I known that he was a trustee the whole time, had he known that he was a trustee the whole time, then we might have gotten into some situation where I was representing two trustees, because he was a -- but, of course, then there would have been a conflict anyway, because he had -- he had certain conflicts. He was a creditor of the trust. He had various

conflicts. So I don't see any way there's a duty to him.

Now, this other fellow, I've described him not unkindly, but accurately in various filings. The trustee, Reuben Durst, as being inert, not just immobile but inert. He was down in Georgia. He had written or signed a letter through the trust attorneys in Connecticut confirming what he had told Matthew, which is you take care of this, I don't want anything to do with it, and he never had anything to do with it except borrow money a couple times through straws.

I don't know where I could get a duty as far as he's concerned. I'm still -- I don't believe I've ever heard from him outside of in these pleadings.

So I think if the Court is focused on this question, that probably it ought to be briefed. I don't think it's been briefed by anybody, and I think it's significant, and that would be my suggestion. I'm just saying -- and I'm talking a lot of facts here, because I don't know how else to answer the question.

THE COURT: If you're joined, does it necessarily result in your disqualification?

MR. YACOVELLE: No. It almost necessarily doesn't.

THE COURT: You think if you're a party defendant,

you can also represent your client?

MR. YACOVELLE: Yes. I think he can -- he can give informed consent to that representation, number one, and number

two, they've gone -- they've gone one step further than they probably should have, because if I'm a defendant, then there's no question I can testify. I'm representing myself pro se. There's no question I can try the case, and if some of it washes off onto Matthew, too bad, whereas if I weren't a defendant and they came in with this argument, they might be in a better position, but that's a question that -- whether I'm defendant or not is something I think should be briefed further.

THE COURT: You think that if you're -- if, capital I, capital F -- you're a defendant, you think your client can give informed consent to you still representing him?

MR. YACOVELLE: I believe so. Yes, because actually, he's already done it in an affidavit. He's already filed an affidavit in response to this motion. We've been over all of this though. There's no distance between us. There's no daylight between us. They may think there is, but that's fanciful. They don't know a thing about our conversations.

So there's no distance between us, and he I'm sure could do that, but the -- see, my position as a defendant is a lot stronger than the position of the lawyers in the cases that were cited here. First of all, the -- oh, the decision by Magistrate Judge Rosen, which was -- they're all Italian cases, by the way, every one of them, plus me and Mr. D'Elia and Ms. Lentini. Italian case.

All right. That's <u>Vacarelli</u> (phonetic). <u>Vacarelli</u> is a case where the Court said that the attorney was going to be disqualified because he was a necessary witness.

Subsequently, several years later, Judge Debevoise wrote an opinion in a case called <u>Main Events</u>, and he didn't follow that. He -- matter of fact, he reversed the Magistrate Judge who had followed it, and he --

THE COURT: I've written on this issue. I mean, I know the distinction between discovery and trial.

MR. YACOVELLE: Right.

THE COURT: I know what you're talking about.

MR. YACOVELLE: Right. So --

THE COURT: But if you're a party defendant, you're going to testify at trial.

MR. YACOVELLE: Oh, I know. I know. So let me say this. In the interest of sound judicial management, there -- there were a lot of difficult things that happen if -- depending upon how these motions are decided, and it's significant enough that I don't think it would kill us to brief the duty issue, because there may be some need for some affidavits, some factual stuff and so forth, you know.

But other than that, no. I think -- I think if I'm a party, I really don't know, you know, what options the Court would take, but I do know that I would be able to participate in the case. Have to.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel. Last word, counsel.

MR. D'ELIA: Just -- and I -- and I know you've got the case down pretty pat. Judge, the issue with regard to the attorney/client relationship, I respectfully submit if I am an attorney and I am given a document that says decisions have to be made by two people in order to effect these assets and I turned around and ignore that document and say I'm just going to go with this guy because I didn't talk with the other guy, he's been absent, I think that's an attorney's breach of his obligation as an attorney, and to deny that third party, in this case, Reuben, his day in court, and Steve, by the way, would be a great injustice.

All as I'm asking you to do is allow me to amend the complaint to join him. If you -- if we want to address the issue that one of the defenses that are going to be raised by Mr. Yacovelle is that there was no attorney/client relationship, let the -- let us do the discovery and let us get to that issue, but not for today. Today I'm simply asking you to recognize that I should have my day in court against Mr. Yacovelle.

This dovetails with what I hadn't argue, and I'll be very brief, is the issue as to whether he's joined or not joined -- and I think he has to be joined -- whether or not he can continue to represent Mr. -- Matthew, and Your Honor

D'Elia/Lentini - Argument

touched on it. Can you seriously say that he's made an informed consent? Does Matthew -- does Matthew understand that to the extent there's a balance due on the loan to Steve Durst, that Matthew is personally liable and that in entering into that settlement, he put himself personally in harm's way? Does he, Matthew, understand that he has a cross-claim against Mr. Yacovelle as a co-defendant in this case?

We have to know what happened in that settlement room when that case was settled and whether or not these things were explained to him. Mr. Yacovelle has those conflicts, and he has to testify in the case.

His only argument in -- the real argument in his pleadings is it's going to work a hardship for him to find another attorney, and in his pleadings, Matt says I don't know any attorneys. There's a Martindale-Hubbell book and there's a phone book filled with them. You throw a stone from here and you'll hit somebody.

THE COURT: You're showing your age by relying on Martindale-Hubbell.

MR. D'ELIA: Exactly. It's now lawyers.com, I believe. I show my age in a lot of ways, Judge. With that, Judge, I will submit for your -- for your consideration.

THE COURT: You want to add something, counsel?

MS. LENTINI: I always have something to say, Your

Honor. There were just a couple other points and one being

Lentini - Argument

that in the State -- the first thing is the second amended trust agreement on the first page -- can't miss it -- says that they are trustees. Reuben Durst and Matthew Durst are co-trustees. First page, very easy, and the representation went on for years.

The second issue that came up was that during the State litigation is that Mr. Yacovelle took the position and argued against the -- that there had to be -- they were co-trustees and that there had to be authority to enter into the settlement agreement by both Matthew Durst and Reuben Durst. There was argument against that, and the argument was that he had authority -- apparent authority.

The trust document itself states that the waiver must be in writing. At no time did Mr. Yacovelle put that representation or that part of the trust agreement before the State Court, and, in fact, Judge McDonnell in the State Court stated in her memorandum opinion that the Court and the mediators and the defendants relied upon the apparent authority of Mr. -- of Matthew Durst to represent that trust.

Another -- one of the other things that also became very striking was Matthew Durst filed a motion for partial summary judgment. I did not supplement, because we just got that after this whole part, but in that, there's a statement of facts, and then there's a ten-page additional statement of facts which is just all paragraphs, and basically, what that

is, in fact, is Mr. Yacovelle announces to the Court that he thinks its relevant that the Court know the background of the State litigation, and of course it's relevant. It's not in numbered paragraphs so that we can respond to it. He claims to the Court that they're undisputed facts.

What he did was submit ten-page submission of testimony. He testified in his motion for summary judgment when he's arguing against the trust who had come forward and said we have a co-trustee, Judge McDonnell, we are to be represented, he -- they do not have authority, and the attorney for the trust is turning around saying no, even though page 1 says you're co-trustee and page 6 says that it must be in writing to waive that right, the attorney for the trust stood before the State Court and argued oh, no, no, no, we don't need that.

And the State Court went forth on -- relied -- they made a mistake. They clearly made a mistake. They relied upon an apparent authority which was presented, and Mr. Yacovelle had the knowledge. He is an excellent attorney. He's obviously read all of these documents, and obviously, he would have read the first page, and he would have read the other part that requires that it be written.

Also in his motion for summary judgment, Mr.

Yacovelle in December of 2011, he submitted as an attachment a certification, his certification, and in his certification, it

Lentini - Argument 1 says, "I've always taken the position that if acceptable documents are present -- " this was regarding enforcement of the 2 3 settlement "-- and if Matthew Durst is still a trustee, though his resignation has been demanded --" that's another issue. 4 5 was demanded. So -- and he continued to go forward. "-- he is 6 7 still a trustee, and if I am still in the case (I am), though individuals posing as co-trustees attempted to fire me, an 8 effort I rejected when they proved to --" 9 10 THE COURT: What are you quoting from? 11 MS. LENTINI: "-- when they proved to be without credentials --" 12 THE COURT: What are you quoting from, counsel? 13 MS. LENTINI: Excuse me? 14 15 THE COURT: What are you quoting from? MS. LENTINI: I'm quoting John Yacovelle's 16 17 certification in response to notice of motion to enforce settlement dated December 14, 2011. 18 THE COURT: This is in the State Court proceeding, 19 20 correct? MS. LENTINI: It's attached as Exhibit C to Mr. 21 22 Yacovelle's motion for partial summary judgment before this 23 Court. So he --THE COURT: We'll get there. 24 25 MS. LENTINI: He placed it before this Court.

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Lentini/Yacovelle - Argument 44 Anyway, so there are issues that he chose as the attorney and he had the knowledge and he made representations before the Court, before the mediators, to opposing parties. He's acknowledged in certifications that co-trustees came forward and tried to fire him and tried to stop Mr. Durst. So he --MR. D'ELIA: Matthew. MS. LENTINI: I mean Matthew Durst. So he marched What was his duty to the co-trustee? What was his duty to the mediators? What was his duty to the State Court? He had duties to all of them. He can't just say I represented Matthew Durst. Matthew Durst doesn't exist in a bubble. He is -- he represented the trust. THE COURT: One more question before we get to you, Mr. Yacovelle. At the end of the day, when you put together all of plaintiff's claims in this case, how much money is plaintiff asking for in this case? What's the case worth? MR. D'ELIA: In excess of a million dollars. THE COURT: In excess of a million dollars? MR. D'ELIA: Yes. Okay. Mr. Yacovelle, I know you want to THE COURT: respond.

MR. YACOVELLE: Judge, I just want to say two things. The first thing I want to say is this scenario of me and the Judge and having this conversation and showing papers and this and that, never happened. Now, that's one of the problems when

somebody comes into the case late in the game. No one was there from that table at that time. So I just want to make that comment.

Now, the second thing I want to say is this. You want to -- want to argue the motion for partial summary judgment right now? I'm ready.

THE COURT: No. We can't do that. That's -- that has to be briefed, and Judge Simandle is going to decide that.

MR. YACOVELLE: Everything has been in, by the way. Everything has been filed that can be filed.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel. I said I'd circle back at the end of this argument, and that's what I want to do now and have a plan going forward.

The first proposed amendment was to add Steve Durst as a plaintiff in a trustee capacity. That's eventually going to be granted. I'll issue an order to that effect when we file the amended complaint. There's no opposition.

The second issue is whether these beneficiaries should be added as plaintiffs. It's conceded as of this point that Matthew Durst's three children are not going to be added. I don't know if we have an affidavit from the minor, but I think plaintiffs are conceding that point.

If the Court grants the amendment to join the beneficiaries as plaintiffs, it will indicate in the order that only those plaintiffs that submit affidavits saying they want

to be plaintiffs will be joined, but I still have to make the decision whether any beneficiary is going to be joined, and I'm reserving on that issue.

The request to join Halloran & Sage, Robinson & Cole, and Ms. Peck, there being no opposition, the Court is going to grant it, except when the amended complaint is filed, the Court is going to ask plaintiffs to properly plead the citizenship.

As to the request to add Mr. Yacovelle, I am going to ask the parties for additional briefing on that. I'm not comfortable on this duty issue. I'd like to give the parties an opportunity to brief it and to submit authority in support of their position. Plaintiffs, you're saying that Mr. Yacovelle owed a legal duty to your two clients. I'd like to know the legal support for that. Mr. Yacovelle, you deny that. I'd like to hear your response.

In addition, counsel, during oral argument, you were citing to certain pages either reading or orally from the State Court litigation. I think you said something about Judge McConnell's opinion or decision, and if you're going to rely on that, I'd like to see it. I can get the affidavit from Mr. Yacovelle from the summary judgment briefs. So you don't need to submit that again, but -- I'll get that, but I don't have -- if you're relying upon some sort of oral or written opinion from State Court, I'd just like to see it.

And then I want to give you an opportunity to also --

The Court - Decision 47 if you want to add anything to the argument, that if the request to join Mr. Yacovelle is granted, whether or not he necessarily must be disqualified. Defendant has argued that his client can give informed consent to that. I'm not at the moment entirely comfortable with that, but I'd like to get plaintiff's position why it's -- why Mr. Yacovelle must necessarily be disqualified if he's joined, and Mr. Yacovelle, I'd like to get your legal support opposing that and support for your position which the Court is just not entirely comfortable with at the moment that your client can give informed consent to that. Plaintiff, how long do you want to submit a supplemental brief? MR. D'ELIA: In your discretion, Your Honor, but I would ask for 30 days. THE COURT: Do you need -- I --MR. D'ELIA: No. THE COURT: -- have no problem giving you --MR. D'ELIA: No. THE COURT: -- enough time, but I would like to

THE COURT: -- enough time, but I would like to address this issue so we can get to the merits of the case. Do you need 30 days? I mean, if -- I don't think you need 30 days

for this issue, because you've already addressed it. How about

two weeks?

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MR. D'ELIA: Fine.

THE COURT: All right. Do you want two weeks to respond, Mr. Yacovelle? And then if I need more oral argument, I'll let you know.

MS. LENTINI: Your Honor, this is just procedurally. If the Court chooses to allow the beneficiaries to be joined and affidavits are required to name them as parties, then generally, we file the amended complaint immediately, but I wouldn't be able to do that unless --

THE COURT: Until you get the affidavits.

MS. LENTINI: Yes. So I just would need extra time for that.

THE COURT: We'll work on that.

MS. LENTINI: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So we know there's going to be some amended complaint. The question is how extensive it's going to be.

Okay. So anything else on the motion, counsel?

MS. LENTINI: We had also discussed earlier for the

-- no. We're fine.

THE COURT: So that takes care of the motion, but I would like to say one more thing. We don't usually get involved in family spats in this Court, although it does happen, and I've seen cases like this in practice for 26 years and on the bench for six years, and I can tell you invariably what happens. The parties come in and they're litigating all

Colloquy

over the place, Cumberland County, Connecticut, New Jersey State Court, New Jersey Federal Court, and everybody beats themselves up for a couple years, and two or three years down the road, everybody looks in the mirror and says why in the world did we do this, why did we enrich the pockets of the lawyers with all these transaction costs and why two or three years ago did not we sit down and try and work this out.

And I see the handwriting on the wall in this case. I just see it, because I've been through it so many times before, that this case is going to be incredibly contentious. The transaction costs are going to be tremendous. There's going to be motions. There's going to be delays, and it's not cheap, and the lawyers are going to be paid a lot of money, and invariably, two or three years from now after there's been a lot of bloodletting, I'm going to say to the parties are you ready to talk settlement, and they'll say yes, and I always wonder why parties do that. Why don't they just reflect and take a deep breath and push away from the table and say we're brothers, we're uncles, we're aunts, we're related by blood, do we really want to go through this for another two or three years, and I would just ask the parties to reflect on that.

I'm guessing -- I don't know for us. Mr. Steven Durst, is that you?

MR. D'ELIA: Yes.

MR. S. DURST: It is me, sir.

Colloquy

THE COURT: And I just -- I just -- time and time and time again I see it, and the transaction costs in this case are going to be in the -- likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and you're all intelligent. You're all professionals. I know you disagree, but parties can disagree and still act professional and cordial, and I just wonder why you don't just sit down.

Is a million dollars a lot of money? Of course it is. It's a tremendous amount of money, but at the end of the day, you're going to spend, three, four, five hundred thousand in transaction costs. What's left? And all the grief that comes with the case and my -- we're here. We're going to move the case. We're going to decide the case, but I just wonder if you want to take a deep breath and say to yourselves is there a way we can sit down and try and work this out.

If you think you -- if you think I can help, I'll be happy to have a settlement conference, but my position on cases is you file a case, you have a right to pursue it. The case is going to move along unless you reflect and talk to each other and say why don't we see if we can work this out before, as they said in the Godfather, we go to the mattresses.

So that's all I have to say, counsel. If I can help in that regard, just let me know. Anything else we need to address?

MR. D'ELIA: Thank you, Your Honor.

	Colloquy 51
1	MR. YACOVELLE: Thanks, Judge.
2	THE COURT: Thank you. We're adjourned. I'll enter
3	an order about the briefing schedule, and we're adjourned.
4	THE CLERK: All rise.
5	(Proceedings concluded at 10:50 a.m.)
6	* * * *
7	CERTIFICATION
8	I, Maureen Emmons, court approved transcriber,
9	certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
10	official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
11	above-entitled matter.
12	
13	Date:
14	MAUREEN EMMONS
15	DIANA DOMAN TRANSCRIBING
16	
17	
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